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Abstract
The paper sketches out a theoretical framework for analysing the interplay
between eco-efficiency, cognition and institutions. It derives from analytical
shortfalls of the prevailing literature, which features strongly engineering and
business economics, by using insights from New Institutional Economics, from
Cognitive Sciences and, partly, from Evolutionary Economics. It emphasises the
role cognition and institutions play in the adoption of “green” technologies by
firms. A cognitive perspective derives from recent research on simple heuristics
and context-based rationality; it is proposed that those recent findings can serve to
analyse decision-making of individual actors or firms and, thus, should comple-
ment economic analysis. A second proposition is that eco-efficiency and
normative rules such as a Factor Four strongly rely upon institutions, i.e. the
ability of institutions to evolve over time and the development of those institutions
that are most appropriate to enhance technological change. In this regard, business
institutions and competition are crucial, but regulatory needs remain in order to
safeguard continuity of knowledge creation. The framework allows for an analysis
why overall adoption of eco-efficiency still can be considered relatively slow and
why some markets and firms are far ahead. As a brief case study the article
reflects upon German waste law’s ability to enhance eco-efficiency.
Keywords: Technical Change, Institutional Change, Cognition, Knowledge
Creation, Environmental Management, Factor Four
JEL-Categories: D8, L1, O3, Q2
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1. Introduction
Improvements in environmental quality will only occur if technological options
become available and are implemented. In this context, four different types of
environmental technologies can be distinguished:
• End-of-pipe technologies such as scrubber technologies for SO2, NOx and
other emissions which are added to a production chain;
• Integrated technologies which allow for the recycling of materials within an
existing production chain;
• Eco-efficiency technologies that allow for a reduction of physical production
inputs (materials, energy, water) while maintaining economic performance;
• New system designs which completely restructure existing production chains.
Among these technology choices, eco-efficiency technologies, new system
designs and related services are of special importance because of their huge
application potential as well as their low costs (Weizsäcker et al., 1997; Lovins et
al., 1999). Though research on the costs and benefits of these options at the level
of individual firms continues to expand and can be expected to grow further
within the next years, the available research analysing the cognitive and
institutional dimensions of these options is still relatively poor. Kemp (1997), van
Dijken et al. (1999) and Wubben (2001) have conducted some recent works on
these items. In a broader vein, Söderbaum (1999) and Bizer (1999) reflect upon an
institutional foundation of ecological economics.
It is our main thesis that eco-efficiency and new systems design strongly rely
upon cognition and institutions,1 i.e. the creativity of the human mind as well as
the ability of institutions to evolve over time and stimulate technological change.
This paper sheds light on what kind of cognitive and institutional mechanisms
enhance a sustainable technology development. In this context, drawbacks of eco-
efficiency such as a possible “abandonment of nature” (Hukkinen, 2001) or the
well-known “rebound-effect” lead economics to query cognition and institutions
too, and not to doubt the overall usefulness of eco-efficiency. Deriving from that
thesis, recent findings of economics outside the ecological branch provide useful
insights into the interplay between cognition and institutions. Any new conception
of humans as claimed by Siebenhüner (2000), if necessary at all, is well advised to
begin with a review of recent findings in cognitive science (Ostrom, 1998). Two
                                                 
1 For the purpose of our paper, an institution is understood as a system of norms with respect to a
particular set of activities. It consists of informal constraints, formal rules and the enforcement
characteristics of both. See also: North (e.g. 1998).
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propositions can be formulated: Firstly, acknowledging a cognitive perspective
leads to permanent search efforts for innovation at the level of individual firms
that are slightly above an “optimal” level of routine and exploitation of existing
knowledge. Secondly, business institutions are able to conquer win-win markets,
thereby internalising negative externalities, if they are guided by normative
decision rules and by a flexible regulatory framework that sets incentives for
knowledge creation.
To prove both propositions, the following paper will sketch out a theoretical
framework based upon New Institutional Economics (NIE) and, partly, cognitive
science and Evolutionary Economics. These branches intensively discuss some
new assumptions about the constraints individuals face, capabilities they might
gain and the processes by which their decisions are co-ordinated. In connecting
their findings to the realm of ecological economics, the paper will demonstrate
how and in which areas these assumptions prove to be useful. The paper is
divided into five sections. The following chapter 2 examines literature on
technological change towards eco-efficiency and some analytical drawbacks.
Chapter 3 introduces recent findings from cognitive science and underlines their
role in the adoption of “green” technologies by firms. Chapter 4 discusses
institutional change and its ability to stimulate eco-efficiency. In chapter 5, the
interplay between cognition and institutions is analysed with a focus on know-
ledge creation by both co-operation and competition. Chapter 6 applies insights
derived from theory to a case study on German waste law and its ability to
facilitate eco-efficiency. The final chapter arrives at conclusions for future
research.
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2. On the economics of technological change
The major role of firms and competition in driving technological change is well
known in economics. Rosenberg (1994) and several others provide empirical
evidence of these mechanisms. Recent evolutionary theories offer additional
insights (Nelson, 1995). The literature on innovation and the environment retains
this focus on the diffusion of discrete techniques, emphasising the importance of
price signals (Jaffe et al., 2000). A striking observation is being made on the path-
dependency of technological change. Describing, inter alia, the typewriter
keyboard QWERTY, David (1985), Arthur (1989), and Foray (1997) demonstrate
that investment decisions are not strictly flexible or perfectly malleable to market
conditions but instead depend on certain paths or trajectories.
It could now be argued that path-dependency lead to an inefficient selection of
technologies by market forces caused by imperfect knowledge and historical
accidents. Path-dependencies would thus hinder firms from entering the new
markets of eco-efficiency. But such a belief would be misleading. On the
technical level, the necessity of carefully developing, testing and improving new
technologies is obvious. Rosenberg (1994, p. 13) points to the fact that almost
three-quarters of R&D costs are related to technical fine-tuning before a new
invention starts to be produced. Synergistic effects with existing production
processes and infrastructures also have to be taken into account. New products
have to fit into existing structures; otherwise the overall switching costs become
incommensurably high. These technical factors provide some convincing rational
explanations in favour of path-dependencies. Using existing technologies allows
for economies of scale (at a given demand), resulting from sinking production
costs and increasing learning curves. New technologies and, furthermore, any
shift towards a new system bears a high risk of sunk costs, as information about
their development and their market demand is – by definition – largely unknown.
According to Schlicht (1998, p. 67) path-dependency appears to be close to
rational behaviour! It can be assumed that huge producers or emerging economies
would have incentives to invest in superior technologies for single products, even
if path-dependencies have to be considered.
While intuitively appealing, such an approach of viewing path-dependencies as
part of overall market efficiency does not seem to capture the whole story. If it
comes to technological regimes as composed of technical artefacts, organised on
co-evolving market and regulatory frameworks, path-dependencies become more
severe. Walker (2000) stresses with a view to large technology systems such as
energy supply infrastructure the importance of embedded institutional, political
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and economic commitments that lead to an “entrapment”, i.e. risks of inertia and
irreversibility. This would mean that a change in technological regimes requires
additional and strong efforts by policies in order to unlock persistent trajectories.
Berkhout (2002: 3) gives a brief overview on this debate in relation to the
environment.
Would these observations reduce the scope of government to the management of
change in technological regimes? At first glance, the distinction between
“efficient” path-dependencies on markets for usual private goods and “inefficient”
path dependencies in technological regimes seems to suggest such a policy
conclusion. With regard to eco-efficiency, this would lead to no further regulatory
needs because markets would almost automatically discover opportunities of low
hanging fruits. But before arriving at such a conclusion one should ask whether
the distinction made applies to markets of eco-efficiency. Can eco-efficiency
technologies be treated as usual private goods? At first sight, eco-efficiency
reduces costs and leads to profitable innovations like any other technological
improvement. Companies will indeed try to explore these fascinating
opportunities. On the other hand, this is like the notion of no big bills left on the
sidewalk because somebody else must have picked them up already. Even
researchers like Porter and v. d. Linde (2000) who emphasise business oppor-
tunities of eco-efficiency underline information deficits and uncertainties due to
unknown market and regulatory trends. Our question is whether these barriers are
stronger than those usually claimed by New Institutional Economics because of
cognitive and institutional constraints that are unique to environmental
technologies. If yes, technological change won’t lead to growing efficiency
without additional efforts specifically addressing knowledge creation in both
arenas of businesses and policies. In this case, the relationship between
technological change and the environment would look slightly more complex than
often proposed in debates about environmental management. Furthermore,
regulatory needs would arise that seem to fall between the usual dichotomies of
economic incentives and command-and-control approaches. Given this hypo-
thesis, a deeper analysis of cognitive and institutional factors in eco-efficiency
becomes necessary.
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3. Cognitive Perspectives of Eco-Efficiency
Economic theory usually assumes perfect rationality based upon perfect
information when individuals make their choices. These assumptions are far
stretched. As a potential alternative, the “bounded rationality” program based
upon parts of cognitive science as developed by Simon (1957, 1978), Kahneman
and Tversky (1996) has gained attention; Rabin (1998) provides an overview on
the adaptation of psychology within economics. Accordingly, human beings are
condemned to sub-optimal economic performance caused by cognitive
constraints.
Research on eco-efficiency seems to be misplaced in both programs. Whereas the
economic standard model usually falls short for dealing with ecological
complexities and related information deficits, any bounded rationality perspective
emphasising biased decision-making can hardly deal with standard questions
about profits, incentives and competition. If firms can make a profit with eco-
efficiency (as it is proved to be the case, see e.g. Porter and v.d. Linde 2000), why
should research bother with rationality? Cognitive perspectives, however, matter
• Regarding the development and inducement of any technology since
individuals’ and firms’ attention and the direction of searching for new
information are limited;
• Regarding the analysis of market trends and selection processes since
information-processing capacities of individuals and firms are limited and
shaped by cognitive constraints;
• Regarding adaptation since the development of strategies depends upon
cognitive factors that guide the search for solutions and link best-practice
examples of competitors with firms’ capabilities.
These dimensions are aggravated by the common goods2 dimension of
environmental technologies. This is especially important when policies address
global public goods such as the earth’s atmosphere and expect businesses to act in
a preventive way. Firms suspect preventive measures of being costly because they
contribute to a global public good, and free-riding activities of competitors are
expected. Therefore, firms tend to act as second-movers and wait for actions taken
by others. In addition, a reduction of cognitive dissonance by dispelling gloomy
                                                 
2 Common goods can be defined as those goods that are not private; e.g. public goods, common-
pool resources, club goods, and network goods. The term has been coined, inter alia, within the
research scope of the Max-Planck Project Group on the Law of Common Goods in Bonn,
Germany.
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information about the likelihood of any natural disaster is a likely strategy. In such
a perception, even the low hanging fruits of eco-efficiency are unlikely to be
assessed. Furthermore, even if they are accounted to be beneficial at the level of
individual firms, at least a residual quantity of commonly shared or even future
benefits remains (positive externalities). How should firms calculate these benefits
or ask for any share of the economic rent as long as they are faced with
knowledge and regulatory uncertainties? Wouldn’t they expect third parties to
profit from those positive externalities and postpone any investment decision?
It thus becomes evident that mechanisms of cognition filters information on eco-
efficiency in two regards: environmental management is perceived as a
contribution to a public good and some benefits are perceived as future benefits
that cannot be part of current revenues. Both points are unique to environmental
technologies; they are stronger than the usual literature on information deficits
claims.3 Seen from this angle, the dissemination of information about the short-
term gains of eco-efficiency and new systems design becomes as critically
important as the mechanisms of knowledge creation at the level of individual
firms. Prices won’t do it alone.
What insights can be drawn from cognitive science in this regard? Surprisingly,
recent cognitive research provides evidence of good performance while little
information is processed. Featuring on how individuals deal with uncertainties
and how they develop rules to stop their search for information, reference is being
made to simple heuristics as rules-of-thumb, which make people smart by
enabling them to quickly find proper solutions (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Chase et
al., 1998). Decision heuristics may include a “Take The Best” approach,
comparing objectives of the most valid clue and ignoring the rest, or a
“Recognition” approach assuming that well-known clues will infer the target
variable. Ortmann and Gigerenzer (2000, p. 136) underline the methodological
role of content specificity in reasoning. A case in point is the surgeon at an
emergency ward who has to decide immediately about a casualty. Though
sometimes mistakes are made, the success rate is apparently high. People do not
deviate that far from rationality as parts of the bounded rationality program
suggest.
Those simple heuristics can perform as well as any rational choice though they
require less information and less time. Heuristics rather follow an ecological
rationality, i.e. they are adapted to certain circumstances at certain places.
Rationality thus becomes context-based. No single heuristic will lead to good
decisions independent of the social and physical environment. Context-based
rationality necessarily implies specificity and refers to both social and individual
                                                 
3 Standard information economics assumes an optimal stop taking into account the costs of
information search and the potential benefits of the new information. Such a stopping rule,
however, can hardly apply to situations with huge uncertainties and ongoing knowledge
creation.
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cognitive constraints. Heuristics develop over a cascade of decisions, carried on
and calibrated by experience among individuals. Choosing among appropriate
rules, interpreting them and applying them to certain problem-solving processes
can be regarded as permanent cognitive creation. It is an ongoing, normal process.
In this analytical context, the economic notion of “shared mental models” as
proposed by Denzau and North (1994) fits almost perfectly. If research takes the
assumption of context-based rationality into account for experimental design,
studies reveal that many people behave relatively well at reasoning about social
contracts (Ortmann and Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 139). They intuitively assess various
benefits resulting from different contracts, thus demonstrating social intelligence.
It thus appears that simple heuristics and context-based rationality are important
elements for a cognitive perspective of eco-efficiency, perhaps even for a wider
context. Economics may keep some principles of methodological individualism
like assumptions of self-interested, advantage-seeking behaviour, while
integrating cognitive perspectives. In our view, this clarifies some of Norgaard’s
(1994) early remarks on the coevolution of technologies, culture and knowledge.
Applying these general remarks to eco-efficiency at the level of individual firms
leads to some new insights. When firms start to integrate environmental concerns
into their standard procedures, they do not need perfect knowledge on
environmental constraints and impacts in relation to their activities. Rather they
need simple heuristics that are able to increase their overall environmental
performance. These simple heuristics build upon existing competences and some
traditional patterns of behaviour. They will become part of firm’s overall internal
procedures, and are not restricted to the scope of single environmental managers.
Both top managers and the individual employee require at least a basic under-
standing of these heuristics in order to internalise them as part of a firm’s routine.
Such a change certainly comes at some cost. Appropriate management tools such
as the COMPASS-model developed by Kuhndt and Liedtke (1999) can lower this
cost. A notion like “Factor Four – Doubling wealth, halving resource use”
(Weizsäcker et al., 1997)4 serves as normative decision rule for mid-term
orientation, facilitating the search for solutions beyond optimisation of existing
trajectories. As a rule-of-thumb it enables developers and strategic planning units
within firms to look for new business opportunities. In doing so, it fuels
capabilities for the “imagination” of new ways of combining resources that are
required (Loasby, 2001, p. 18). Compared to these advantages, the various
processes of the International Standardization Organization (ISO) are likely to
require more information, imply higher transaction costs and do not necessarily
lead to better outcomes, in particular not for small and medium-sized enterprises.
                                                 
4 Factor Four is considered as one normative decision rule; other concepts such as “zero
emissions”, “Factor 10”, the “natural step” serve similar functions but are not laid down
especially here.
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A cognitive perspective of eco-efficiency would thus underline a combination of
normative orientation, managerial tools and striving for economic efficiency via
procedures of trial and error. It will certainly lead to different mechanisms within
the various firms as well as on different markets. Heuristics develop over time in
different contexts. In other words, there is no “universal application of eco-
efficiency” within the concept as Hukkinen (2001, p. 312) asserts, if those
cognitive dimensions are applied that are obvious. The statement of Gabel and
Sinclair-Desgagné (1998, p. 100) that those changes are revolutionary, disruptive
and costly also seems to be misplaced. By acknowledging cognitive perspectives,
eco-efficiency strategies are well advised to build upon existing competences and
established patterns of behaviour, thereby avoiding establishing a new
organisational code within a firm. It rather follows to permanently invest in the
creation of new knowledge slightly above a level that might be regarded as
optimal. Improving eco-efficiency can take a course of evolutionary, incremental
and low-cost change. Chapter 5 of this paper will elaborate on that point.
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4. Institutional Perspectives of Eco-Efficiency
It is interesting to note that cognitive research seems to deviate from pure
individualistic approaches and begins to analyse the interplay between individual
cognition and social institutions. New Institutional Economics has a strong bond
on business institutions of firms and markets, analysing incomplete contracts,
information exchange and enforcement procedures. The central idea is that any
firm is based on the positions and actions of its individual members, i.e. it is not to
be understood as a collective entity behaving like an individual actor. As long as
single firms are not spurred on by inter-firm competition to invest in knowledge
and skills, continuity and persistence to change are more likely than openness and
flexibility. In many cases a firm’s leader can pursue his or her self-interest
because of less effective control (principal-agent problem). The “dynamic
capabilities” model of a firm as developed by, inter alia, Langlois and Robertson
(1995), Teece and Pisano (1994) provides a coherent way of identifying innova-
tive systems of business institutions that allows for the permanent accumulation of
knowledge. It explicitly takes cognitive and institutional perspectives into
account. Drawing on that literature, table 1 (see below) provides a typology for
institutions relevant to technological change. It becomes clear that technological
change depends upon a variety of institutions, with market-based institutions
partly in a central and partly in an ancillary role. An institutional mix that tailors
eco-efficiency ought to take that variety into account.
Regarding eco-efficiency, institutional perspectives matter during three stages of
the production chain:
• The period when decisions on investments are shaped by the legal and political
framework, ideologies, and expectations about future developments, where
both business and governance institutions matter;
• The adaptation period within a firm when best firms ought to be imitated,
where business institutions matter most;
• The period of system renewal when incremental learning effects have come to
an end and must be superseded by any new innovation where, again, both
business and governance institutions matter.
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Table 1: A Typology of Institutions Relevant for Technical Change
Institution Characteristics Example
Business institutions Internal formal or informal
institution
a) Business contracts,
hierarchical order,
b) Routines, business culture
Technological standards Internal, hybrid or outer
formal institution
a) Agreement among firms
b) International Standardiza-
tion Organisation (ISO)
c) Statutory order by govern-
ments
Legal institutions for market
regulation
Outer formal institution with
direct impacts
Property rights, competition
law, tax law, liability law,
business law
Institutions for the provision
of public or other common
goods
Outer formal institutions with
indirect impacts
Education, research, security,
macroeconomic stability
Informal institutions Informal societal institutions Customs, ethical norms,
ideologies, general
expectations etc.
Source: own compilation.
Technical change can be expected to run smoothly within a stable institutional
frame (exceptions resulting from “serendipity” inventions coming out of the blue
indeed have to be admitted). However, as institutions change over time and are
challenged to change by cognitive creation and/or competing institutions, the
situation becomes more complex. Our thesis is that only incremental technical
change of private goods remains within the scope of business institutions, whereas
switching from one trajectory to another and integrating common goods strongly
relies upon combining flexible business institutions such as new firms, networks
or property rights with a foreseeable change in the regulatory framework allowing
business institutions to adapt over time. This combination is crucial for the overall
accumulation of knowledge in economic development. As Metcalfe (2001, p. 20)
puts it: “It is the combination of institutions for selection and development that
gives to capitalism its undoubted potential for change”. Given our notions of
heuristics, context-based rationality, and institutional path-dependency as outlined
by David (1994) and North (1998), those processes can evolve, but take some
time and are hard to predict.
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Change towards a more sustainable technology development is highly intertwined
with cognitive and institutional factors. Path-dependencies matter in both areas
too. They do not start at any fixed time (T) caused by a singular decision, but
rather during a stage of mutually interdependent decisions and frames lasting from
the decision-making period to their internal adaptation. After a path has started to
emerge, routine effects stabilise existing cognition and business institutions. For
this reason, the overall costs of changing from one path to another become higher
than without looking at cognitive and institutional dimensions. This is especially
important for those eco-efficiency options which may be beneficial in standard
economic terms but which require different images (e.g. small and light instead of
large and massive). A technical innovation favouring a longer durability of
materials or goods depends upon a complementary institutional innovation
enabling business to move from production-based to service-based value. Again,
normative decision rules like a Factor Four stimulate the search for innovation on
a broad basis as they allow for either a combination of incremental changes within
a certain trajectory (e.g. hypercar) or for changing from one trajectory to another
(e.g. new energy systems). They add higher aspirations to environmental manage-
ment that go beyond technological change and move the whole item up in a firm’s
hierarchy.
The crucial question for eco-efficiency remains as to what extent business
institutions adopt to new challenges under prevailing conditions of insufficient
information-processing capacities and typical market failures. How do business
institutions evolve if they seek to escape the trap of reducing complexities and
uncertainties down to business plans and management tools? It is exactly here that
firms and markets must gain some orientation from outside. In such a situation
processes of fundamental learning as analysed by Siegenthaler (1997)5 must
commence. No single rationality, neither individual nor market-based nor
political, possesses enough knowledge about new institutions for an overall
change and their impacts on technological change.6 That knowledge is only
created by evolutionary change itself. Here, the interaction of business institutions
with the set of capabilities located in national organisations and the frameworks of
law and politics arises on the research agenda. Research on eco-efficiency has to
query knowledge creation and institutional progress beyond markets and firms.
                                                 
5 According to Siegenthaler (1997: 756), fundamental learning involves a change in cognitive
rules, a change in the rules, which govern individual information processing. It follows a
situation of fundamental uncertainty characterised by a lack of confidence in such rules.
6 I do not deny the Kantian perspective of detecting imperatives from rationality. Our definition
of institutions applies to a broader context and includes the social environment, i.e. the setting,
enforcement characteristics, and the acceptance of rules.
Cognitive and institutional perspectives of eco-efficiency 15
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environmental and Energy
5. Knowledge Creation by Co-operation and
Competition
Who creates knowledge for markets if not markets themselves? A simple, but
straightforward answer for knowledge creation is “let’s get together”. Institutions
create knowledge about solutions to problems via social learning processes. Such
processes rely heavily on communication or, more precisely, on understanding the
problem as well as on developing and testing new rules (Ostrom, 1998,
pp. 12–14). Norgaard (1994, pp. 147 ff.) emphasizes in a similar vein (but in a
slightly different language) the social dimension of knowing. In practical terms, it
means the exchange of analysis, the development of new orientation, and it might
even include tentative thoughts about business strategies. A proper mix of
individuals as well as of competences and skills are crucial factors to any success.
A sound and reliable leadership integrating different perspectives, working with
(partly) shared mental models, dealing fairly with conflicts and aiming at common
solutions is thus a critical element of learning processes. According to Ostrom
(1998) and Siegenthaler (1997), new rules must be designed and weighed
extremely carefully outside competitive markets within such groups of co-
operative learning. New business institutions can be developed in firms, networks
or niche markets. Afterwards they still have to pass their reality test. Here,
markets and the actual conditions in society are back on the game. A preliminary
test on niche markets provides an important intermediate step towards their full
release onto national and international markets.
Can firms undertake such an exercise without hampering the specific core
competence, which has developed over time? They surely can, but they have to
weigh up the associated advantages and disadvantages. Whether firms take on the
risk of changing their core competence will largely be related to their capabilities,
i.e. to the costs of creating new capabilities and to their perception of the social
and political environment. Recent theorising about a knowledge-based firm
(Leonard-Barton, 1995; Grant, 1996; Granstrand, 1998; March, 1999) offers some
methodological tools in analysing these processes. According to these findings,
innovative firms develop new core capabilities by permanently striving for
solutions to customers’ problems, the integration of external knowledge,
experimenting, and implementation of new findings. This is, indeed, a laborious
task, which is illustrated by fig. 1. Such permanent striving for innovations does
not coincide with the business model outlined by Gabel and Sinclair-Dasgagné
(1998, pp. 108–115; 2001). Both authors view business institutions as internal
constraints, whereas our approach views business institutions as capability that
derives from individual cognitive abilities plus organisational features. Here, our
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cognitive and institutional perspectives deviate from a traditional approach
seeking to minimise transaction costs and underline the necessity to generate new
knowledge by individual and organisational efforts.
Fig. 1: Knowledge creation in firms
Source: Leonard-Barton 1995.
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Given that firms’ permanent striving for innovation will not be able to fully
overcome uncertainties, market competition remains necessary as a process of
both discoveries and selection. Competition leads firms towards problem solving,
importing external knowledge, experimenting with new solutions and testing new
hypotheses about those goods able to meet customers’ demands. Decentralist
market structures with small and medium-sized enterprises are crucial because a
large number of independently innovative firms leads to more experimentation
and, hence, towards more diversity in finding solutions. At the same time, lock-in
of markets is avoided which may arise through larger companies, mergers and
dense networks. Recent concepts of evolutionary competition according to Kerber
and Saam (2001), Loasby (2001), and Metcalfe (2001) underline these insights.
Both co-operation and  competition remain important in any sustainable
technology development and related research.
Some regulatory consequences still have to be pointed out. One relates to
government. Government hardly possesses all the information necessary to steer
business and society in a certain direction (e.g. to enhance eco-efficiency) by a
one-time shot of framing. One comparative knowledge advantage of governments
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can be seen in setting quality targets for the environment, but governments are
especially weak regarding options for action at the micro level and the co-
ordination thereof. At the level of decentralised decisions, markets can be
expected to work better. Markets are able to produce business institutions and
allocation mechanisms as soon as any minimum orientation set by targets and
framing principles becomes clear. Given necessary regulatory deficits, such a
framework must evolve over time and maintain some supervisory functions.
Business institutions can do a good job in internalising externalities, but they
surely cannot completely solve common-good problems (Ostrom, 1998, p. 17).
Governments are responsible for setting the framework conditions and organising
a process by which new knowledge on managing the commons can be gained,
while markets are responsible for finding and managing solutions. Society is a
critical factor in both areas, resulting from its different roles as voter, employee
and consumer. Having underlined these different responsibilities, one should
remember that the processes of setting targets and finding instruments are
interrelated: each side has to co-operate with the other (Wegner, 1997). Such a co-
operation is not meant in the sense of integration, but rather in the sense of mutual
interdependence. The connection is characterised by on-and-off factors, with each
activity functioning at a proper time and in a proper manner. Here, research might
refer to recent analysis of transaction-cost politics (Dixit, 2000) and information
economics of political processes (Stiglitz, 1998), and not to old-fashioned welfare
economics.
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From a regulatory perspective the question of agenda–setting remains puzzling.
Welfare economics entails a window of opportunity for any leviathan as soon as
any form of market failures can be stated. Of course, standard environmental
economics goes along the same vein, pointing out numerous targets, instruments,
standards etc. Policy–makers are viewed to be autonomous and like-minded in
their agenda setting. In contrast to these approaches, the public choice and
Buchanan-perspective of the state is much more sceptical as to what extent
agenda–setting is driven by bureaucrats and self-interested politicians. This debate
cannot be outlined here. Relevant for this paper is the question of knowledge
generation via a proper mix of institutions. Here, some elements of regulatory
competition7 during the stage of agenda–setting can be promising. If business
institutions ought to evolve over time, governments will have to accept markets’
abilities to bring forth appropriate solutions as well as ongoing market failures
during times of transition. Some regulatory competition between governments and
businesses during agenda–setting can thus be seen as a response to the question
what institutional mechanisms may provide most favourable outcomes. This
proposition is based upon the need for experiments as indicated in figure 1 above.
In other words: self-regulation of markets may sometimes offer better results than
regulation, but a permanent supervision has to be guaranteed by governments.
Again, this perspective is slightly different to the view outlined by Gabel and
Sinclair-Desgagné (1998, p. 113; 2001) as it tries to avoid any “stunning blow”
recommended by both authors and focuses on knowledge-creating effects of
economic or legal regulatory approaches. Such governance can be seen as an
ongoing and powerful, but imperfect effort and not as a one-time decision of
setting a frame.
Specific regulatory consequences for eco-efficiency surely depend upon domestic
institutions in a country. What seems to be important is the notion of evolutionary
competition driven by small and medium-sized companies that has to be
supported by legal principles and authorities. In addition, normative decision rules
like a Factor Four spurs competitive markets better than single technological
standards to invest in new knowledge. Both elements of a regulatory framework
ought to be accompanied by economic incentives such as eco-taxes because price
mechanism remains to be an important communication tool. As knowledge
generation is a decentralised process, legal requirements for business accounting
as well as open access to this information become relevant. Any technological
prospect, however optimistic it might be, thus depends upon a proper regulation
for competitive markets and knowledge generation, not on technological change
itself.
                                                 
7 I do not enter the realm of regulatory competition here; for a balanced overview see v.d. Berg
(2000) and Trachtman (2000).
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6. The Case of Waste and Resource Management
The methodological advantage of cognitive and institutional perspectives can be
illustrated by considering an example: waste and resource management as a
possible starting point for eco-efficiency. It is illustrative because it strongly relies
upon business action (and private households that are not considered here) as well
as on regulatory efforts by governments. If cognitive and institutional perspectives
are worth pursuing for research, our analysis should be able to provide valuable
insights beyond prices and property rights. Following our perspectives, analysis
starts with sound problem definition. Waste management and policies differ
significantly if they are directed to disposal problems on the one hand, or if they,
on the other hand, take into account the broader context of saving scarce
resources, contributing to lower overall emission levels, and intervening less in
natural systems. The latter, indeed, is the very essence of ecological economics
and eco-efficiency.
In Germany, politics has undertaken an important step in formulating integrated
environmental policies by reformulating existing waste law into a Waste
Avoidance, Recycling and Disposal Act (Kreislaufwirtschafts-/Abfallgesetz)
which came into force on 7 October 1996. It extends the previous waste concept
by including those substances, surpluses and residues, which are neither
deliberately produced nor used for any purpose. The cornerstones of the new
legislation are: a) consistent application of the Polluter-Pays-Principle, b) creation
of a prevention-oriented hierarchy of obligations (avoidance before thermal or
material recycling), c) producers’ responsibility for their products (to be
reinforced by statutory order), d) extending opportunities for the privatisation of
waste disposal.
At first glance, the construction of the Waste Avoidance, Recycling and Disposal
Act looks like a promising way of shifting from pure disposal management to
comprehensive solutions including eco-efficiency. It allows private waste
businesses to be profitable and it should lead to manifold, decentralised solutions
including the development of new markets between producers and users of
recyclable materials. Almost six years after the Act entered into force, however,
the expected gold rush in the waste avoidance industry has not yet taken place.
Instead, orientation deficits are stressed, inter alia, at the international recycling
trade fair ‘Entsorga’ in Cologne 2000. Disposal is declining, thermal recycling
facilities are running, but other recycling activities, waste avoidance and resource
savings are still in a premature stage. Since 1990, overall resource use has been
stagnating rather than declining (see table 2).
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Table 2: Trends in German Waste Production and Resource Use
1990 1993 1997 2000
Waste Disposal 130.3 90.8 49.4 n.n.
Waste
RecyclingA
14.2 19.8 30.8 n.n.
Resource UseB 1 460 1 413 1 440 1 432
In Mill. Tons, figures for 1997 and 2000 on a tentative basis.
A = Includes thermal recycling, other forms of incineration and biomass recycling.
B = Includes raw material extraction in Germany used for economic purposes plus imports of
raw materials.
Source: Federal Statistical Office 2001, www.destatis.de (6 March 2002).
What are the reasons for such a low adoption of waste avoidance and resource
saving strategies? Along with traditional economics one may start analysis by
referring to price developments. Here, competition on the markets for thermal and
energetic recycling as well as the transition period until the disposal order of the
“TA Siedlungsabfall” enters into force in 2005 has forced business’ waste prices
to stagnate or even to decline (Cantner, 2001; SRU, 2002). Beyond that analysis,
information asymmetries on high quality waste management also have to be taken
into account. The EU single market currently reinforces these economic
distortions, as thermal recycling options outside Germany have become extremely
cheap while information about their quality is poor. This coincides with widely
differing environmental standards for recycling facilities in the EU. Under these
conditions, emerging material recycling and waste avoidance industries maintain
good arguments for postponing their investments. Waste and resource legislation
does not yet lure out eco-efficiency.
These findings underline the usefulness of New Institutional Economics applied to
waste issues and are well in line with our framework. Beginning here, a more
particular analysis drawing on cognitive findings can depart. The question is why
the emerging paradigm of eco-efficiency could not yet overcome these barriers if
pursuing such a strategy is profitable now. Addressing this question, our cognitive
perspective refers to the unclear scope of problem definition. Though article 1 and
4 of the German Waste Avoidance Act refer rhetorically to resource saving and
waste avoidance, the whole act regulates nothing else but disposal and recycling.
Firms’ attention almost naturally follows these constraints. They do not yet have
an incentive to assess new business markets.
Furthermore, the legal notions of resource saving and waste avoidance are vague
and remain to be translated into business terms. As Ebreo and Vining (2001) point
out, waste avoidance is perceived different to recycling! Any target for resource
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productivity like Factor Four would offer the advantage of being scored at the
level of individual businesses, but there is nothing like that in the law. Context-
based behaviour at the level of individual firms adds to these deficits insofar as
the economic potential of reusing or selling materials, steam, heat, the redesign of
products, etc., is likely to be examined in a superficial way or even grossly
ignored as long as no legal or economic incentive is advisable. Existing business
institutions such as contracts, internal procedures, customer relationships, the pull-
effect of recycling facilities, etc., can still be regarded tighter in their constraints
than the envisaged options of waste avoidance and resource saving. Knowledge
creating institutions such as accounting or reporting obligations on resource use
are not yet part of German waste legislation.
On the other hand, the manifold existing initiatives to disseminate information on
eco-efficiency such as the World Business Council on Sustainable Development
(WBCSD), the trade fairs in Duesseldorf and Klagenfurt, etc., can be regarded
experimental and don’t yet outreach market niches. Against this background, it
can hardly be expected for eco-efficiency to evolve from existing waste
legislation, even if some principles are stated. Regulatory policies for eco-
efficiency need a bias on permanent knowledge creation, and a departure from a
framework for internalisation of disposal cost. According to our view, a Factor
Four target (or a comparable one) for increasing eco-efficiency, reporting and
accounting guidelines, agencies and other institutions for knowledge dissem-
ination and transformation as well as a campaign driven by private initiatives
would do a better job.
It is our view that such cognitive and institutional analysis offers useful insights
into identifying constraints, concrete impediments to implementation, and
capabilities of businesses, in particular when specific markets are analysed. It may
complement traditional analysis in regard to waste disposal and recycling. Some
comparative advantage can be seen as soon as emerging markets are to be
analysed. Here, our methodological focus on novelty, on knowledge creation as
well as on the proper institutional mix between governments, firms, and markets,
seems to provide original insights beyond traditional economics.
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7. Cognition and Institutions on the
Research Agenda
To sum up, research perspectives on cognitive and institutional dimensions are
critical to any further progress of eco-efficiency analysis. Whether or not related
concepts like waste avoidance, resource management, zero emissions, and Factor
Four will gain importance will depend upon the methodological acknowledge-
ment of heuristics, context-based rationality and institutional change. Waiting for
pioneering examples to trickle down into the economy would neglect both
dimensions of technical change. A public provision of information on success
stories would neglect the costs of knowledge generation and, thus, fall short of
transforming that information into know how. Both firms and policy-makers (as
well as other actors) are challenged to design appropriate institutions that allow
for a maximum of adaptation flexibility at the micro level while safeguarding the
evolution of a framework at the macro level. Both co-operation and competition
remain important in any institutional design for a sustainable technology develop-
ment. Our proposition regarding some regulatory competition between business’
and governments’ institutions of market regulation will lead to new governance
perspectives. Accordingly, the good news is a capability of markets to internalise
externalities and to provide for common goods, the bad news is its limitation in
combination with limited governments’ capacities. How and which types of
institution make better policy and allow for adaptation flexibility at the micro
level deserves further research.
Our view is thus different to the conventional assumption of minimising any
institutional impact. It too departs from a division of labour that views govern-
ments autonomous from markets. We believe that our theoretical framework will
allow for integrating the role of ideas, lifestyles, motivation, and consumption
patterns, too, while being based upon sound assumptions of economic behaviour.
In following that perspective, research can address diversity between actors and
uncertainties about future developments. It will be able to analyse evolving
markets as well as the impacts of regulation and other social impacts on markets.
Of course, discovering the overall interaction between ecological systems,
cognition, eco-efficiency, technical and institutional change will take a long time
– but it will be a fascinating journey.
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